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Kellis v. Farber: "Incorporation"
Venue

Returns to Louisiana

An Orleans Parish domiciliary brought suit in that parish on a cause
of action arising from an automobile accident that occurred in Jefferson
Parish. Made defendants were the alleged tortfeasor, a Jefferson Parish
domiciliary; his employer, a domestic corporation with its registered
office in Jefferson Parish; the liability carrier for them both, a foreign
insurer; and the plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier, another foreign
insurer. After the trial court sustained a declinatory exception of improper venue and ordered the case transferred to Jefferson Parish, the
court of appeal denied the plaintiff's application for a supervisory writ.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Dennis,
reversed the lower courts.' The court held that Orleans Parish constituted
proper venue for all defendants according to Code of Civil Procedure
articles 762 and 73,3 which as exceptions to the general rules of venue
contained in article 42, 4 constitute "an extension, supplement and legal
part of the provisions of article 42" by virtue of article 43,5 which
6
makes article 42 "subject to" its exceptions.
Kellis v. Farberis important because it implicitly resolves the debate
in Louisiana jurisprudence over whether a reference to article 42 suffices
to reference the exceptions to article 42. Because Kellis limits its holding
to the question of whether the exceptions to article 42 are incorporated
within it through the operation of article 43, the decision may suggest
that venue provisions extraneous to the Code that defer venue deter-7
mination to article 42, such as that found in the Direct Action Statute,
may not trigger incorporation. On the other hand, the narrow holding
may import an intent to apply incorporation to any extraneous venue
provision, not just the Direct Action Statute. 8
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1. Kellis v. Farber, 523 So. 2d 843 (La. 1988).
2. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 76 provides alternative venue at the
insured's domicile "on ... any insurance policy," other than those offering life, health,
or accident benefits.
3. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 73 provides that venue is proper for
all solidary obligors where any one of them may be sued under article 42.
4. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 42 expresses the concept of defendantdomiciliary venue.
5. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 43 makes article 42 "subject to" the
enumerated exceptions within the Code as otherwise provided by law.
6. 523 So. 2d at 846.
7. La. R.S. 22:655(B) (Supp. 1989).
8. See, e.g., La. R.S. 13:3203 (1968), the venue rule for the Long Arm Statute.
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This note will discuss the holding of Kellis and analyze its potential
effects. After reviewing the relevant venue provisions contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, a summary of the jurisprudential debate over
incorporation will place Kellis in historical context. An exposition of
the opinion in Kellis will follow. The reasoning of Kellis, the "codal
scheme" on which it relies, and the policies underlying venue and its
administration will then be analyzed, and an alternative approach to
venue determination will be suggested.
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

Chapter 2 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure contains the
majority of the venue provisions present in the Code. Section 1 contains
general dispositions. Article 41 defines venue as "the parish where an
action or proceeding may properly be brought and tried under the rules
regulating the subject." 9 Article 4210 contains the general rules of venue
for individuals and a variety of legal persons. Of particular importance
in this discussion are subsections 1, 2, and 7. Subsection 1 provides in
pertinent part that venue for an individual domiciled in the state is "in
the parish of his domicile."" Subsection 2 provides that venue for a
domestic corporation is "in the parish where its registered office is
located.' 1 2 Finally, subsection 7 provides venue for a foreign insurer in
East Baton Rouge Parish. 3 Article 43 states that "[t]he general rules
of venue provided in Article 42 are subject to the exceptions provided
in Articles 71 through 83 and otherwise provided by law.' 4 These other
exceptions are present elsewhere in the Code and the Revised Statutes.
Article 45 provides three rules to determine proper venue when certain
venue provisions conflict. First, "[a]rticle 78, 79, 80, 81 or 83 governs
the venue exclusively, if this article conflicts with any of Article 42 and
71 through 77." 1 Second, "[i]f there is a conflict between two or more
Articles 78 through 83, the plaintiff may bring the action in any venue
provided by any applicable article.' ' 6 Finally, "[i]f Article 78, 79, 80,
81, 82, or 83 is not applicable, and there is a conflict between two or
more Articles 42 and 71 through 77, the plaintiff may bring the action
in any venue provided by any applicable article.' 1 7 Article 44 deals with
waiver of exceptions to venue.

9. La. Code Civ. P. art. 41.
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 42(1) expresses the traditional civilian notion that one must
be sued before his own judge.

11.

La. Code Civ. P. art. 42(1).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id.art.
Id.art.
Id.art.

42(2).
42(7).
43.
45(1).
45(2).

17. Id.art. 45(3).
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Section 2 of Chapter 2 contains exceptions to article 42. Articles
71 through 77 contain the so-called permissive exceptions, which generally
employ the verb "may" and provide alternative venue possibilities. Articles 78 through 85 contain mandatory venue rules, which generally
employ the verb "shall" and provide only one venue possibility. Articles
73 and 76 are the two permissive exceptions most relevant for an
understanding of Kellis. Article 73 provides in pertinent part that venue
in an action against joint or solidary obligors is proper "in any parish
of proper venue, under Article 42, as to any obligor who is made a
defendant."' 8 Article 76 provides that venue on any insurance policy,
other than those providing life, health, or accident insurance, may be
in the parish where the loss occurred or the insured is domiciled. 9
Section 3 contains the rules for transferring a case to another venue.
Article 121 provides that "[w]hen an action is brought in a court of
improper venue, the court may dismiss the action, or in the interest of
justice transfer it to a court of proper venue." 20° Article 123 in pertinent
part provides that "[flor the convenience of the parties and the witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court . . . may transfer a civil case
to another district court where it might have been brought." ' 2' However,
the article also forbids this transfer when "brought in the parish in
which the plaintiff is domiciled, and in a court . . of competent
' 22
jurisdiction and proper venue."
The Direct Action Statute also contains a relevant exception to article
42. In actions "against the insurer alone, or against both the insured
and the insurer jointly and in solido," venue is proper "in the parish
in which the accident or injury occurred or in the parish in which an
action could be brought against either the insured or the insurer under
the general rules of venue prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure Art.
42.'23
DEBATE

Surridge v. BennantiN set the stage for the debate whether a reference
to article 42 also references the exceptions to that article. In Surridge,
the plaintiff filed suit against a St. Bernard domiciliary and his foreign
insurer on a cause arising from an automobile accident that occurred
in Jefferson Parish. Plaintiff argued that venue was proper as to the

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.art. 73.
Id.art. 76.
Id.art. 121.
Id.art. 123.
Id.
La. R.S. 22:655(B) (Supp. 1989).
261 La. 282, 259 So. 2d 324 (1972).
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insurer in Orleans Parish under article 77,2 since the insurer was a
"person" within the meaning of the statutory language. The court
concluded that article 77 could provide proper venue, because since
"article 42 contains the general rules of venue, it is to be understood
that the 1962 Amendment [to the Direct Action Statute] . . .incorporated
the exceptions to the general rules." '26 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that article 77 was unavailable to plaintiff in this instance, because the
insurer did not qualify as a "person."
In Davis v. Hanover,27 the third circuit, ignorig Surridge, found
that the reference in the Direct Action Statute to article 42 reached
none of the exceptions to that article. Oddly enough, however, this
limitation on the reach of the Direct Action Statute worked in favor
of the plaintiff. After being injured in a collision in Jefferson Davis
Parish between automobiles driven by a Calcasieu Parish domiciliary
and a Vermillion Parish domiciliary, plaintiff brought suit against the
insurers of his host and the other driver in Calcasieu Parish one day
before the action would have prescribed. 28 Almost four months later,
plaintiff added both drivers as defendants. The insurers argued that
since the Direct Action Statute reaches the exceptions to article 42,
article 73, which allows suit to be brought at the domicile of any solidary
obligor who is made defendant, controlled venue determination. Since
the original complaint did not name the Calcasieu Parish domiciliary,
the insurers argued that Calcasieu Parish was an improper venue as to
the defendants who were named there. 9 The decision is significant

25. La. Code Civ. P. art. 77 provides that "[a]n action against a person having a
business office or establishment in a parish other than where he may be sued under
Article 42, on a matter over which this office or establishment had supervision, may be
brought in the parish where this office or establishment is located."
26. Before amendment in 1962, the Direct Action Statute read in pertinent part: "The
insured person .. . shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms
and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in the
parish where the insured or insurer is domiciled, and said action may be brought against
the insurer alone or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido, at the
domicile of either or their principalplace of business in Louisiana." (emphasis added).
The amended version provided venue for actions against the insurer or the insurer and
the insured in solido "in the parish in which the accident or injury occurred or in the
parish in which an action could be brought against either the insured or the insurer under
the general rules of venue prescribed by Art. 42, Code of Civil Procedure." (emphasis
added).
27. 289 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
28. Prescription is the real stake in many of these cases. See S. McKenzie and H.
Johnson, Louisiana Insurance Law and Practice § 25, at 45-46, in 15 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1986).
29. Instead, the insurers argued, venue was proper for the defendants named in the
original petition under article 42(7) in East Baton Rouge Parish. Thus prescription had
run.
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because it provides a rationale for a decision whether the Direct Action
Statute should reach exceptions to article 42. In this vein, the court
declared:
[W]e are compelled to accept Davis' version of the meaning of
the venue provision due to the plain meaning of the use of the
disjunctive (parish in which an action COULD be brought against
EITHER the insured OR the insurer), rather than the conjunctive
(parish in which an action could be brought against BOTH the
insured AND the insurer), or of a mutual modifier (parish in
which an action could be brought against either the insured or
the insurer, WHO IS MADE A DEFENDANT). 0
Finding that "the legislature intended to broaden the permissible venues
available to claimants, rather than to restrict them," 3 the court rejected
the plaintiff's incorporation arguments. Nevertheless, as commentators
have pointed out, excluding consideration of article 73 from venue
determination in this case calls into question the availability of Calcasieu
Parish venue as to the insurer of the Vermillion Parish domiciliary,
because venue for both insurers is proper in Calcasieu Parish only
through the use of the solidary obligor rule of article 73. Otherwise,
the insurer of the Vermillion Parish domiciliary must be sued in East
Baton Rouge Parish. As to this insurer, the action would have prescribed.3 2
Meyers v. Smith, 33 like Surridge, presented the supreme court with
the question of whether the Direct Action Statute reaches article 77
when it references article 42. Plaintiff sued on behalf of her minor
daughter to recover for the wrongful death of the father. The accident
occurred in St. John the Baptist Parish. Plaintiff filed suit in Jefferson
Parish naming several defendants, none of whom were domiciled there.
The parties stipulated, however, that one defendant, an insurer, was
handling the claim from its Jefferson Parish office. Plaintiff argued that
the Direct Action Statute provided proper venue under article 77, since
the exceptions to article 42 are incorporated within it. Referring to its
previous determination in Surridge as dicta, a plurality of the court
34
rejected the incorporation doctrine.

30. 289 So. 2d at 294.
31. Id.
32. S. McKenzie and H. Johnson, supra note 28, at 47-48.
33. 419 So. 2d 449 (La. 1982).
34. The court relied in part on Davis for its holding, despite the consequent narrowing
of the range of possible venues available to the direct action plaintiff-a result incongruous
with the Davis rationale. McKenzie and Johnson find a tendency in both the legislature
and the courts to broaden the scope of direct action venue. S. McKenzie and H. Johnson,
supra note 28, § 25, at 48. Meyers, an obvious counterexample, is treated as an anomaly.
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Significantly, the court based its reasoning on the principle that
exceptions to the general rule of article 42 are to be narrowly construed.
This principle, stated again in Justice Cole's dissent in Kellis, derives
from Louisiana jurisprudence dating at least to 1878, when the supreme
court in Montgomery v. Louisiana Levee Co.35 stated:
It is a familiar rule that statutes in derogation of a common
right must be construed strictly. The entire article 165 [of the
Code of Practice of 1870, containing exceptions to the defendantdomiciliary venue] is an exception to the general rule established
by article 162 [defendant-domiciliary venue], and in derogation
of the common right of every resident of the State of Louisiana
36
to be sued at the place of his domicile or residence.
The Meyers court found that since the venue provisions of the Direct
Action Statute are exceptions to the general rule of article 42, they must
be narrowly construed. Thus, the court concluded that the Direct Action
Statute does not reach article 77 or any other exception to article 42,
because no "mention is made of the exceptions to those rules provided
by Article 43, although the legislature could have easily incorporated
'37
those exceptions had it desired to do so.'
EXPLICATION OF

KELLIS

The court first considered proper venue for plaintiff's uninsured
motorist carrier. Reasoning from the principle expressed in article 43
that article 42 is "subject to" its exceptions, the court found that since
article 42 is subject to article 76, article 42 was inoperative in this
context. Instead, venue was proper according to article 76 in Orleans
Parish, plaintiff's domicile. Further, since under supreme court
jurisprudence 38 all defendants were obligated solidarily to the plaintiff,
article 73 provided proper venue for all defendants "in any parish of
proper venue, under Article 42." 39 Having already determined that article
76 controlled as against article 42, the court found venue proper for
all defendants according to article 76. "[I]t is clear," the court concluded,
"that article 76 and the other articles set out in article 43 are an
''
extension, supplement and legal part of the provisions of article 42. 40
The court thus decided the case without resort to the venue provision
in the Direct Action Statute referencing article 42.

35. 30 La. Ann. 607 (1878).
36. Id. at 608.
37. Meyers, 419 So. 2d at 451.
38. Burton v. Foret, 498 So. 2d 706 (La. 1986); Hoefly v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982).
39. La. Code Civ. P. art. 73.
40. Kelis, 523 So. 2d at 846.
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In answering defendants' argument based on Meyers that the Direct
Action Statute does not reach the exceptions to article 42 by referencing
that article, the court disapproved Meyers: "In the absence of a contrary
expression, when the Legislature adopts the general venue rules in an
extraneous act, it should be presumed that it did so with respect for
'4
the codal system and with the intention to adopt the codal scheme." '
However, the court distinguished Meyers because that case considered
the application of a venue provision contained in a statute extraneous
to the Code. 42 Thus, again, the court shifted the basis for the decision
away from the Direct Action Statute.
Answering the argument that a defendant has a "natural or inherent
right to be sued at his domicile" that could override this interpretation
of the Code, the court stated that the civilian notion of venue, upon
which defendants had based their argument, had been rejected when
the legislature enacted the Code of Practice of 1825. This rejection was
evidenced by the exceptions to the general rule of venue contained in
that code as well as their subsequent proliferation. This proliferation
"mirrors the newly emerging bases of modern venue statutes,'' 43 which
are based on factors such as
the convenience of both parties; the relationship between the
forum and the cause of action; the reduction of litigation through
certainty in the laying of venue; the places where the subject
of action or part thereof is situated; the place where the cause
of action arose; the place where the seat of government is
located.44
Finally, answering defendants' argument that article 76 is inapplicable
in a tort case, the court found that an action on an uninsured motorist
policy fit within the broad statutory formula: "[A]s long as the action
is on any insurance policy, there is nothing in article 76 or the Code
'45
that would bar the article's operation.
Dissenting in Kellis, Justice Cole attacked the majority position on
several fronts. Emphasizing the status of articles 71 through 77 as
exceptions to the general rules contained in article 42, he concluded
they should be strictly construed. Thus,
[a]lthough the plaintiff is authorized under article 76 to sue upon
her insurance policy in the parish of her domicile, article 73
specifically limits venue to parishes proper under article 42, not

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.at 846-847.
Id.at 847.
Id.at 848.
Id.
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article 42 and any venue proper under an exception such as
article 76.6
Second, Justice Cole attacked the majority's construction of the
intent of the legislature. Since the jurisprudence on which the majority
relied to find the defendants solidarily liable appeared after the enactment
of the Code, Justice Cole argued it was unlikely that the legislature
47
intended the result in Kellis.
Criticizing the court's reliance on the proliferating policy bases of
venue it had outlined, Justice Cole asserted that "only the plaintiff is
likely to be convenienced by venue in Orleans Parish. ' 48 He claimed
that nonparty witnesses would be made to travel out of their parish to
testify, that the decision will increase litigation "as it is applied to the
other exceptions," and, further, that since the accident occurred in
4
Jefferson, that parish had the closest connection to the cause of action. 1
Finally, Justice Cole pointed out that should plaintiff lay venue
properly in his domicile under the Kellis rule, courts would be prohibited
from transferring the case under article 123, even if venue is "far from
the locale of the witnesses, the defendants or the tort scene." 50
Justice Lemmon, who concurred with the majority opinion, asserted
that "the heart of this case [was] that plaintiff [had] cumulated two
actions against plural defendants."" Articles 462 and 463, which contain
the rules for cumulation of parties and of actions, were applicable, and
these articles required that venue be proper for each action. Since
defendants had not excepted to the plaintiff's cumulation of actions and
since the court had correctly determined venue to be proper for the
defendants, the decision itself was correct. Further, Justice Lemmon
held out the possibility that "even if venue were proper only as to one
defendant under Article 42"52 and one of its exceptions, venue would
still be proper through the application of the doctrine of ancillary venue. 3
ANALYSIS

Reasoning
Despite the majority's attempt to distance itself from the jurisprudence construing the venue provision in the Direct Action Statute and

46. Id. Justice Marcus filed a brief dissent paralleling Justice Cole's remarks on the
strict construction of exceptions to article 42: "The language of article 73 does not say
article 42 'subject to' the exceptions provided in articles 71 through 85." 523 So. 2d at
848 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
47. 523 So. 2d at 848 (Cole, J.,dissenting).
48. Id. at 848-49.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 849-850.
52. Id. at 850.
53.

Cf. Kellis, 523 So. 2d at 849, where Justice Cole discusses ancillary venue.
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thus from Meyers, it is clear that the Direct Action Statute does apply
to the Kellis facts. The plaintiff clearly wished to sue "insured[s] and
insurer. * . in solido." Thus Meyers is not distinguishable on the grounds
that it involved a venue provision extraneous to the Code. Further, the
court cited Surridge as authority for its incorporation theory, and Surridge used the Direct Action Statute to arrive at its result.
Beyond the narrowed mechanics of Kellis, however, a conceptual
difficulty arises from the majority's finding that exceptions to article
42 are "an extension, supplement and legal part of the provisions of
article 42." This finding is open to an effective attack by proponents
of the strict construction of exceptions, 4 like Justice Cole, because it
fails to specify whether exceptions to article 42 are always already
included within the compass of that article or whether each exception
remains outside article 42 until invoked to provide venue.
Consider a hypothetical based on the facts of Kellis. Since plaintiff
wishes to sue her uninsured motorist carrier, she turns to the general
rule, which through the operation of 42 then incorporates article 76.
At this point, the other exceptions remain outside article 42. Plaintiff
next turns to the other defendants. Since they are solidarily liable, article
73 is incorporated with article 42. Since article 73 provides venue under
article 42 and since article 76 is now within article 42, article 76 provides
proper venue under article 42 for all solidary obligors.
The alternative procedure begins with the assumption that all exceptions to article 42 are already present within it. Here plaintiff has
merely to resort to article 73. Since venue is proper as to all solidary
obligors under to article 42 and since article 76 is already incorporated
within article 42, venue is proper as to all obligors under article 42, in
Orleans Parish, the domicile of the plaintiff-insured.
Because the majority structures its reasoning by beginning with article
76 and then turning to article 73, it appears that exceptions are to be
sequentially incorporated. On the other hand, language from Kellis suggests the latter procedure. The court states that the exceptions are "an
extension, supplement and legal part" of article 42.
If the exceptions are sequentially incorporated the theory is subject
to attack as being unduly complex. Before article 73 is incorporated, it
is not a part of article 42; nevertheless, it can be part of article 42.
Further, while strict construction is irrelevant if all exceptions are always
already incorporated within article 42, sequential incorporation may be
subject to an effective attack through the strict construction of excep-

54. Reliance on this rule has been attacked because the term "common right" as
applied to defendant-domiciliary venue is not defined by the courts that use it and because
defendant-domiciliary venue is anachronistic. See Comment, Contract Action Venue in
Louisiana: Time for a Change?, 25 Loy. L. Rev. 367, 370 (1979). But see Justice Cole's
remarks in Kellis, 523 So. 2d at 848.
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tions. For instance, if the procedure intended by the court is to aggregate
exceptions sequentially, plaintiff turns first to her uninsured motorist
carrier, and article 76 is incorporated in article 42. Meanwhile, article
73 remains outside article 42. However, article 73 also names article 42.
Prior to the incorporation of article 76, article 73 deferred venue to
article 42, so this reference can be said to remain empty of any previous
incorporations. Because exceptions must be construed narrowly, the reference to article 42 in article 73 is not a reference to article 76 "inside"
article 42.
Regardless of which procedure for incorporation the Kellis court
used to reach these exceptions, however, the conflict between a principle
that would read exceptions narrowly to exclude reference through article
43 and one that would incorporate the exceptions into article 42 throws
into stark relief the outlines of two competing concepts of Louisiana's
venue provisions. The first of these, represented by the defendants'
"natural rights" argument in Kellis, views article 42 as occupying a
privileged, if contingent, position with regard to its exceptions. Thus,
article 42 embodies the fundamental value inhering in the very existence
of venue rules." The exceptions to this general rule, however, control
in those situations where this fundamental value is either displaced by
another 6 or itself calls for an exceptional venue. In any event, the
exceptions are not "incorporated" in the general rule because they are
"derogations of the common right" and supplant the general rule only
in narrowly circumscribed contexts.
The court in Kellis aligns itself with the view that article 42 does
not occupy a privileged position with respect to its exceptions. Under
this view, there is no venue provision that alone expresses the fundamental policy animating venue; rather, insofar as the venue provisions
express such a policy, they express it equally. Exceptions, then, occupy
equally-privileged positions with respect to each other and to article 42,
which serves as a "catch-all" for those cases that fail to satisfy the
requirements of an exception. Further, because this venue system is
"evolving," article 42 does not embody the legislature's expression of
the fundamental value at the heart of venue. Instead, this general rule
and its exceptions implement that value in concert. This structure is said
to reveal the "original design of the redactors" to incorporate the

55. One commentator has suggested that defendant-domiciliary venue is based on the
fear that "since the plaintiff controls the institution of suit he might behave oppressively
toward the defendant unless restricted." Sunderland, The Provisions Relating to Trial
Practice in the New Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 188, 192 (1933). Cf.
La. Code Civ. P. arts. 123 and 5051.
56. An example of such a displacing value is implementation of a substantive law.
See La. Code Civ. P. art. 5051.
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exceptions to article 42 within it. 57 When there is no fundamental,
privileged rule, the "subject to" formula does not express the idea of
derogation, but the idea of incorporation.
Interpretation
With regard to the venue scheme within the Code, three articles
yield the majority of the arguments to be made in support of either
the incorporation or the fundamental-rule concepts of venue. After a
brief introductory remark, article 42 specifies that an "individual" domiciled in Louisiana is to be sued in the parish of his domicile. Beginning
with this principle, the statute embarks on a series of analogies to
various legal entities, which are, for its purposes, the equivalent of
individuals. For each of these defendant entities, the article prescribes
an equivalent of domicile.5"
This pattern of analogies based on defendant-domiciliary venue may
be contrasted with the exceptions to article 42. Article 76, for instance,
provides alternative venue on any insurance policy at the domicile of
the plaintiff. On the other hand, this very pattern of analogies may be
said to illustrate the failure of defendant-domiciliary venue to provide
for the majority of cases. Thus the idea of a fundamental rule would
have no foundation in the fact of the article. Further, none of the venue
provisions contained in article 42 explicitly denominates venue for these
legal entities as "domicile": venue here is simply venue. Finally, if an
exception's reference to article 42 means defendant-domiciliary venue,
what is to be made of article 80, which provides alternative venue
"where the defendant in the action is domiciled"? 5 9 If a reference to
article 42 sufficed to signal defendant's domicile, the legislature would
not have felt compelled to spell out its intention in article 80 so explicitly.
The language of article 43 is similarly problematic.6 Aside from the
question whether it creates a pool of exceptions within the compass of
article 42 or whether certain exceptions to article 42 are by virtue of
its action sequentially aggregated, there is the question of what "subject
to" means. The majority in Kellis took the position that the language
creates an inclusive relationship between the general rule and its exceptions. However, the etymology of the word "subject" reveals quite

57. Kellis, 523 So. 2d at 847.
58. L'Enfant, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Louisiana Civil Procedure, 43
La. L. Rev. 491, 495 (1982).
59. La. Code Civ. P. art. 80.
60. With the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, the language now contained
in article 43 was excluded from the general rule and established in its own article. This
exclusion may then be said to emphasize the separateness of article 42 and its exceptions,
in that no reference to the exceptions is now included in the general rule itself. See La.
Code Prac. art. 162 (1870).
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another meaning: that one object is placed or thrown ("ject") beneath
("sub") another. 61 The two objects thus participate in a spatial relationship, but they remain distinct. Should one be incorporated in the
other, the spatial relation inherent in the word would vanish. Thus, in
terms of article 43, the "spatial" relationship means, by analogy, that
the "higher" object, the exception to article 42, is legally prior to, or
controls, the "lower" object, article 42. To denote an inclusive relationship, article 43 could have simply specified that the exceptions are
"included in" article 42.62
Finally, article 45 provides arguments militating against both the
incorporation of exceptions within article 42 and the strict construction
of exceptions as derogations from a "common right." Article 45(3)
suspends the operation of article 43 when article 42 conflicts with articles
71 through 77.63 In such a conflict, plaintiff may lay venue according
to any of the applicable, conflicting provisions. Since Kellis builds its
incorporation theory on the "subject to" language in article 43 and
since article 43 is suspended when article 42 conflicts with the enumerated
exceptions, it is apparent that the legislature could not have intended
articles 71 through 77 to constitute a legal part of article 42.
But article 45(3) also argues against the idea that the legislature
intended that exceptions to article 42 be narrowly construed as derogations of common right. Here, since under article 45(3), both article
42 and the enumerated exceptions provide proper venue in case of
conflict, article 42 appears as a mere alternative rule rather than the
fundamental expression of venue policy. Further, since article 42 is not
"subject to" these exceptions, they are no longer derogations, but form
with article 42 a pool of equivalent alternatives.
Thus the "subject to" language with which Kellis builds its incorporation theory can apply only to venue provisions other than those
found in articles 71 through 77. The language of article 45(1), however,
argues against the incorporation of articles 78 through 83 when it provides for the possibility of conflict between these exceptions and article
42. 64 If articles 78 through 83 are incorporated within article 42, there

61. W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language 606 (3d ed. 1897).
62. The provenance of the "subject to" formula may support the incorporation
concept. This statutory language enters Louisiana law as the French verb "recevoir," to
receive, in the original, French version of the Code of Practice of 1825. The French
language controlled in cases of conflict with the English. See Tucker, Source Books of
Louisiana Law, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 82, 87 (1932), on the subject of conflict between the
versions. The exceptions to article 42 are then "received" or "included" in it. Idiomatically,
however, the French wording merely means that the general rule "has" some exceptions.
See La. Code Civ. P. art. 5051.
63. See supra text accompanying note 17.
64. This argument applies as well to article 45(3), which also provides for conflict
between article 42 and its exceptions.
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can be no conflict, because by definition they are part of article 42.
As an exception to article 42 that provides alternative venue under
article 42, the Direct Action Statute controls venue determination as
against that article, but also allows a plaintiff to sue in venues appropriate under article 42 if he wishes:
[Sluch action may be brought against the insurer alone, or
against both the insured and insurer jointly or in solido, in the
parish in which the accident or injury occurred or in the parish
in which an action could be brought against either the insured
or the insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed by
Art. 42, Code of Civil Procedure.6
Since article 42 contains specific provisions setting out proper venue for
domestic"6 and foreign67 insurers, it may be that the legislature in its
1962 revision of the Direct Action Statute meant merely to incorporate
these provisions by reference. However, had the legislature intended such
a restrictive interpretation, it might simply have specified the paragraphs
it meant to include. Further, since article 42 is not an exception to the
general rule of venue, but the general rule itself, a reference to article
42 should not be construed strictly. Arguably, a reference to article 42
in an exception to article 42 deprives the referring statute of its status
as an exception.
A search for similar provisions deferring venue determination to
article 42 reveals a bewildering set of statutory formulations. Most
interesting in terms of the incorporation doctrine is Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:3203,68 the venue rule for the Long Arm Statute, which
provides alternative venue under the Code generally, but excludes article
42 from consideration. According to the logic of the Kellis rule, this
reference would exclude every exception to article 42 contained in the
Revised Statutes, possibly even itself. 69
Perhaps more germane to the interpretation of the Direct Action
Statute are Code of Civil Procedure articles 73, 593, 2633, and 4653.1 0

65. La. R.S. 22:655(B), amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 934 (emphasis added).
66. La. Code Civ. P. art. 42(2) allows for proper venue where the insurer's registered
office is located.
67. La. Code Civ. P. art. 42(7) allows for proper venue in East Baton Rouge Parish.
68. La. R.S. 13:3203 (1968).
69. La. R.S. 13:3203 provides that "[a] suit on a cause of action described in R.S.
13:3201 may be instituted in the parish where the plaintiff is domiciled, or in any parish

of proper venue under any provision of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure other
than Article 42." (Emphasis added). If all exceptions to article 42 are included in it by
virtue of article 43, the reference may exclude from consideration the domicile of plaintiff,
since it too is an exception to article 42. Cf. La. Code Civ. P. art. 77.
70. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 73, 593, 2633, and 4653. The articles provide proper
venue for solidary obligors, for class actions, for enforcement of mortgages or privileges
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These articles track the above-emphasized language of the Direct Action
Statute, with the difference that they omit the words "general rules."
It may be argued that use of this phrase is meant expansively, that is,
to reach all exceptions. By the same token, a reference merely to article
42 would limit the reach of the statute to article 42 without its ex7

ceptions . 1
Articles 42 and 43 provide a second approach to this difference in
terminology. Article 42 announces that it contains the "general rules of
venue," and article 43 refers to article 42 as providing them. Thus, the
legislature may have intended the words "general rules" as a signal that
only the general, fundamental rules of venue contained in article 42 are
to govern direct action venue. This ambiguity, however, may indicate
that there is really no intended difference between an exception that
uses the word "general" and one that does not. Having reached this
impasse, the wording of article 241672 provides some help. Providing
venue "under Art. 42 or 77," it deals with the two articles as separate
entities. If article 77 were included in article 42, there would be no
need to Viention article 77. Should it be concluded that the two variant
formulations of reference to article 42 are interchangeable, the above
implication of the language of article 2416 suggests that the Direct Action
Statute should travel no farther than the borders of article 42 proper.
If, however, "general rules" plus "article 42" is not interchangeable
with "article 42" standing alone, and if the term "general rules" is
taken in an expansive sense, the implication set up in article 2416 is
73
meaningless in the direct action context.
Comparison of the Direct Action Statute with Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:1113(D) and 22:1175(C), 74 however, shows how a venue
provision designed to reference all exceptions to article 42 contained in
the Code is constructed. Both provide alternative venue "in any proper
venue authorized under the Code of Civil Procedure." Thus, arguably,
had the legislature intended the Direct Action Statute to reach all exceptions to article 42, it would have drafted the statute similarly or

and for concursus proceedings respectively. As with the reference contained in the Direct
Action Statute, the legislature may have intended only certain provisions within article 42
to govern venue determination because of the nature of the specific proceedings.
71. Id. art. 5058.
72. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2416 provides venue for garnishment proceedings.
73. Unless, that is, the sequential mode of extending article 42 is employed and an
exception deferring venue to article 42 like article 73, which refers to article 42 without
using the words "general rules," acts to trigger the second extension.
74. La. R.S. 22:1113(D) (1977 & Supp. 1988) provides venue for proceedings to
impose penalties for acting as an insurance agent without a license and for paying
commissions to such persons. La. R.S. 22:1175(C) (Supp. 1988) provides venue for proceedings to collect penalties and to receive injunctive relief in connection with, among
other things, the misrepresentation that one is an insurance agent.
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simply deferred venue determination to the entirety of the Code of Civil
Procedure, rather than taking the cryptic approach of relying on article
43 for this result.
What emerges from a consideration of the language and structure
of Louisiana's venue provisions is that there was no "original design
of the redactors." What the legislature enacted was a set of venue rules
much like that perceived by Justice Dennis in Kellis: a group of venue
rules implementing the policy of venue in concert and without a privileged, central member. However, since there is no "original design"
unifying Louisiana's venue provisions, they do not express the concept
of incorporation or for that matter, the common right/derogation concept. Instead the venue provisions are to be applied not as a system,
but as a series of unconnected, alternative rules according to the conflict
rules inherent in the exceptions, the conflict and waiver rules contained
in article 43 through 45, and the transfer rules contained in articles 121
through 124.
The legislative history of both the Direct Action Statute and article
73 supports this position. 7 Among other things, the 1962 amendment
substituted "article 42" for "domicile" of the insured or insurer as one
proper venue in a direct action. Article 73 is derived from articles 165(6)
of the Code of Practice of 1870. Article 165(6) provided proper venue
' 76
in an action against solidary obligors "at the domicil of any of them."
It appears, then, that the legislature, in amending and replacing these
venue provisions, used "article 42" as a convenient synonym for "domicile.
'77

Policy
If the language and structure of Louisiana's venue provisions argue
against a legislative intent to incorporate the exceptions to article 42
within it, the policies that animate venue and those that should guide
its judicial administration show that incorporation is not only unintended
but unwise.
The broad policy category that serves as the reason for venue is
the notion that the place of trial should be convenient. 78 Two aspects

75. See supra note 26 for comparison of the relevant language of the Direct Action
Statute before and after amendment in 1962 to accord with the then newly-enacted Code.
76. La. Code Prac. art. 165(6) (1870).
77. But cf. La. Code Civ. P. art. 80.
78. See Comment, Contract Action Venue: Time for a Change?, 25 Loy. L. Rev.
367, 371 (1979), for a useful summary of the development and policies of common law
venue and, generally, Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1949).
The corresponding treatment of civil law venue has proven elusive. In France, whose
venue scheme closely resembles Louisiana's, "the general feeling is," according to a
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of convenience can be gleaned from article 123.79 First, this article
authorizes the trial court to transfer a civil case to another district in
which plaintiff could have brought it when the transfer is "[flor the
convenience of the parties and the witnesses, in the interest of justice." 80
Second, the article implies that a case may be transferred for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses because these concerns are
central to venue itself.
An additional aspect of convenience appears in considering proper
venue for tort cases: "where the wrongful conduct occurred, or in the
parish where the damages were sustained."'" Article 74, since it allows
venue not at a party's domicile but at the locale of the event underlying
plaintiff's action, demonstrates that convenience to the evidence con82
stitutes another policy behind venue.
Kellis is subject to criticism on at least two of these fronts. Suppose,
for example, an automobile driven by an Orleans Parish domiciliary
collides with that of a Caddo Parish domiciliary. The accident occurs
in Orleans. Both drivers are insured, and the Caddo domiciliary sues
in his home parish. As Justice Cole observed, under facts such as these
Kellis would authorize venue in Caddo Parish, "far removed from the
locale of the witnesses, the defendants or the tort scene." 83 Further,
because of the plaintiff-domiciliary proviso in article 123, the otherwise
legitimate transfer of this case to Orleans Parish would be prohibited. 4
Another policy embedded in article 123 is that venue be "just."
On one hand, justice in this context is merely the equivalent of convenience: a convenient forum is a fair forum. On the other hand, this
policy, rather than a reason for venue, is a principle of its proper
administration. Thus, if plaintiff should deliberately attempt to force
defendant to compromise by laying venue in a forum distant from the

treatment of contemporary civilian venue, "that it makes little difference which court in
France hears a given case, if, after all, every judge renders justice in the name of the
French sovereign nation." deVries and Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions-A
Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 306, 316 (1959). Las Siete Partidas
merely declares that the "ancient sages" thought defendant-domiciliary venue just. Las
Siete Partidas, Part. 3, Title 2,Law 32, at 52 (L. Moreau Lislet and H. Carleton trans.
1820).
79. La. Code Civ. P. art. 123.
80. The article also provides, however, that should plaintiff bring suit in his domicile
and jurisdiction and venue be proper there, the case cannot be transferred.
81. La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.
82. Although some evidence may be easily transported from the tort scene, increasing
amounts of such evidence make transportation increasingly burdensome. Further, some
evidence may be incapable of transportation at all.
83. Kellis, 523 So. 2d at 849 (Cole, J., dissenting). Justice Cole's criticism is less
persuasive as to the inconvenienced defendant, since one of the parties under these facts
will be inconvenienced whether venue is laid in plaintiff's or defendant's domicile.
84. Id.
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witnesses, the defendant, or the evidence, it would be "just," even if
venue were otherwise proper, for the case to be transferred under article
123. Again the idea that the legislature intended the exceptions to article
42 be "incorporated" in that article is cast in doubt.8 5
An additional administrative policy, related to "justice," is the
prevention of forum shopping. According to Justice Cole, the attorney
for plaintiff in Kellis admitted on oral argument that he chose Orleans
Parish because "he obtains 'better' judgments there." ' 6 Since plaintiff's
uninsured motorist carrier had not contested the lower courts' transfer
of the case, Justice Cole. surmised that the uninsured motorist carrier
knew it was in no danger of being cast in judgment and knew it was
merely plaintiff's "venue vehicle." 's7 Justice Cole objected to this "shopping" because it was unintended by the legislature. Further, it may be
objected that the practice may also tend to erode confidence in the law,
the courts, and the legal profession.
One further administrative policy appears in Justice Cole's dissent
in Kellis: judicial efficiency. If venue litigation is to be kept at a
minimum, venue rules must be certain, and they must be construed as
providing as close to a "bright line" standard as possible. Here, the
Kellis rule presents the distinct possibility that a great many new and
unsuspected combinations of exceptions to article 42 will be litigated as
plaintiffs attempt to avoid the rigors of prescription and unsympathetic
judges.88
Finally, article 5051 embodies another administrative policy. The
article provides that "[tihe articles of this Code are to be construed
liberally, and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure
implement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves.''89
Since it enlarges the available venues allowed the plaintiff in a direct
action, Kellis appears to have accomplished the goal set out in this
article. However, Kellis is an anomaly in the "incorporation" debate,
since it did not involve prescription? °0 Construing venue rules so that
they recede from "bright line" status, then, may help implement the

85. Article 73 may provide some protection for defendants in these circumstances.
In its second paragraph article 73 provides that "[i]f the action against this defendant
[who serves as venue vehicle] is compromised prior to judgment, or dismissed after a
trial on the merits, the venue shall remain proper as to the other defendants, unless the
joinder was made for the sole purpose of establishing venue as to the other defendants."
La. Code Civ. P. art. 73.
86. Keflis, 523 So. 2d at 849 (Cole, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Another benefit of certainty here would be the minimizing of judicial discretion.
89. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5051.
90. Prescription rules represent the desire that legal rights have an end. Again, the
policy is certainty. See Comment, Legal Rights and the Passage of Time, 41 La. L. Rev.
220, 228 (1980).
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substantive law by allowing tort plaintiffs to add defendants after the
actions would have prescribed, but the resulting uncertainty has its cost.9'
Suggested Approach
Kellis suggests that the earliest assertion that the exceptions to article
42 might be incorporated within it comes from Judge Tate, when writing
for this review in 1969, he expressed dissatisfaction over certain language
92
in Lavergne v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.
for implying that direct action suits may never be brought at
other than these venues authorized by the direct action statute.
If the direct action suit against the insurer is properly cumulated
with an action against a joint or solidary obligor, it may also
be brought in any parish or proper venue under Article 42 as
to any other solidary obligor . . .9
It is clear, however, that, far from endorsing the principle of extension Kellis applies, Judge Tate's remarks concern only the ranking
of, or choice between, inconsistent exceptions to article 42. He continues,
"[Flor example, had a joint tortfeasor domiciled in Vermillion been
joined [with the foreign insurer of another, non-resident tortfeasor] as
codefendant, the venue would be proper in that parish ... even though
it is not one of the venues authorized by the direct-action statute for
suits against the insurer alone." 94 Thus, in its direct action aspect, Kellis
would call for venue as specified in the Direct Action Statute, but in
its solidary liability aspect, the case would call for venue according to
article 73. For the purposes of venue determination, then, Judge Tate
is merely stating that when a direct-action defendant and a tortfeasor
are also solidary obligors, neither the direct action venue rule nor the
quasi-offense venue rule of article 74 control. Instead, article 73, the
venue rule for solidary obligors, provides proper venue under article 42
for all defendants and actions.
In contrast to the procedure established in Kellis, application of
Louisiana's venue provisions as a series of alternative rules provides a
certain procedure that arrives at a convenient forum. Consider this rule
application when used to determine venue for the Kellis action. Plaintiff
wishes to sue four solidary obligors in one forum: the two tortfeasors,

91. Id.
92. 208 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). The majority in Kellis cites Judge Tate's
remarks as direct authority for the proposition that each exception to article 42 is an
"extension, supplement and legal part" of article 42. Kellis, 523 So. 2d at 846.
93. Tate, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 TermCivil Procedure, 29 La. L. Rev. 269, 275 (1969).
94. Id.
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Jefferson Parish domiciliaries; the foreign insurer of both tortfeasors;
and plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier, also a foreign insurer. Article
73 provides proper venue "under Article 42, as to any obligor who is
made a defendant." 95 Article 45(3) does not apply because article 73
does not conflict with article 42. Article 42 provides venue for all insurers
under subsection 7 in East Baton Rouge Parish. 96 Both tortfeasors may
be sued under subsection 1 "in the parish of [their] domicile, ' 97 Jefferson
Parish.
But since plaintiff wishes to sue her uninsured motorist carrier,
article 76(3) also applies to plaintiff's action. 9 Under article 76(3) venue
is proper "in the parish where the loss occurred." 99 Jefferson Parish,
or where "the insured is domiciled,"' 1 Orleans Parish.
Since plaintiff also wishes to sue the two tortfeasors and their insurer,
the venue provisions contained in article 74 and the Direct Action Statute
are potentially applicable as well. Thus, it is necessary to consider the
conflict rules implied in the applicable provisions. To begin with the
simplest scenario, had plaintiff wished merely to sue one tortfeasor
without an insurer, article 45 would allow plaintiff to lay venue according
to either article 74, "where the wrongful conduct occurred, or . . . where
the damages were sustained," 10 1 or article 42(1), in defendant's parish
of domicile or residence. 0 2 If, however, this defendant had an insurer,
the Direct Action Statute would provide venue "in the parish in which
the accident or injury occurred or [where] an action could be brought
against either insured or insurer under . . . Art. 42."03 The striking
identity of authorized venues in a tort suit both with and without an
insurer-defendant, implies 1) that the legislature intended to duplicate
permissible venues for each type of suit and 2) that the legislature
intended that when an insurer is sued along with the tortfeasor, the
Direct Action Statute should control as against article 74.
Consider now the Kellis facts: plaintiff wishes to sue two tortfeasors
and their insurer; thus, the Direct Action Statute controls. Venue is
proper, then, where the accident or injury occurred, Jefferson Parish,
or, under article 42, in the parish of domicile of insured or insurer,

95. La. Code Civ. P. art. 73.
96. Id. art. 42(7).
97. Id. art. 42(1).
98. Although the article does not explicitly provide venue for uninsured motorist
policy actions, the words "any other insurance policy" are extremely broad. See Id. arts.
5051-52.
99. Id. art. 76(3).
100. Id.
101. Id. art. 74.
102. Id. art. 42(1).
103. La. R.S. 22:655(B) (Supp. 1989).

1216

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Jefferson Parish or East Baton Rouge Parish. But plaintiff also wishes
to sue her uninsured motorist carrier. Article 45 authorizes venue either
under article 76, in Jefferson or Orleans Parishes, or under article 42(7),
in East Baton Rouge Parish.
It appears then that plaintiff must file two suits: one against the
tortfeasors and their insurer and one against her uninsured motorist
carrier. If she wishes to sue all defendants in one forum, plaintiff must
avail herself of article 73, the venue rule for solidary obligors, which
authorizes plaintiff to sue where venue would be proper as to any
defendant under article 42, that is, where any defendant is domiciled.
In the final analysis, then, article 42 provides proper venue on the Kellis
facts in Jefferson Parish or in East Baton Rouge Parish. Otherwise
plaintiff must file two suits.
Conclusion
Even though plaintiff has been injured in an automobile accident
in a parish other than that where she is domiciled by residents of the
other parish, she can nevertheless bring suit against the tortfeasors and
their insurers in the parish of her domicile by suing her uninsured
motorist carrier as well. In order to reach this result, Kellis found that
the exceptions to article 42 are somehow incorporated within it. By
embracing this theory of Louisiana's venue provisions, the court rejected
the traditional notion that defendant-domiciliary venue is a "common"
or fundamental right and the principle that exceptions to article 42 are
to be construed narrowly. The statutory language and structure of Louisiana's venue provisions and the interests of convenience, judicial efficiency and certainty in the law support the better view: that the legislature
did not intend to adopt either system, providing instead a series of
independent, alternative rules to be applied according to the conflict
rules inherent in the exceptions, the conflict and choice rules found in
article 43 through 45 and the transfer rules found in articles 121 through
124.
John M. Tarver

